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OPINION
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Thurman Stanley appeals his sentence and argues that the District Court erred by
requiring him to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). We will affirm.
I.

Background
Stanley was charged with eleven counts relating to various sex trafficking and

controlled substance offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1591(a), 1591(b)(1),
1594(a), 2421 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to
four counts related to transporting individuals in interstate commerce to engage in
prostitution and unlawful possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The
government dismissed the remaining counts.
The plea agreement contained a provision discussing sex offender registration, as
follows:
The defendant understands that the court, as a condition of supervised
release or probation, must order the defendant to comply with all sex
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offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act and that, if applicable, defendant must register and keep
registration current and accurate in each of the following jurisdictions: the
location of residence; the location of employment; and location of any
school that defendant is attending.
(App. at 64.) According to the terms of the agreement, failure to comply with those
requirements and other obligations could “subject [Stanley] to prosecution under federal
law.” (App. at 65.)
The probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”) before Stanley’s
sentencing hearing. Consistent with the plea agreement, the PSR recommended that the
District Court impose, as a special condition of Stanley’s supervised release, that he
comply with SORNA’s registration requirements. Stanley objected to those registration
requirements in his sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, arguing that
his conduct did not meet SORNA’s definition of a “sex offense.” See 42 U.S.C.
§ 16911(5) (2017)1 (defining “sex offense” for purposes of SORNA).
The Court ultimately imposed a punishment that, among other things, conditioned
Stanley’s supervised release on his compliance with SORNA’s registration requirements.
With respect to that condition, the Court’s order reads, “You must comply with the
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901,
et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex
offender registration agency in the location where you reside, work, are a student, or were
convicted of a qualifying offense.” (App. at 6.)
Stanley timely appealed.
1

Recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5).
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II.

Discussion2
Stanley argues that we must vacate the portion of his sentence requiring him to

register as a sex offender. We disagree because he waived his right to challenge
SORNA’s applicability when he entered into a plea agreement with the government that
clearly states the necessity of complying with SORNA’s registration requirements.
Plea agreements are analyzed using contract law principles. United States v.
Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007). We must “strictly construe the text against
[the government] when it has drafted the agreement,” and thus we resolve any
ambiguities against the government. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But
there is nothing ambiguous here. Plea agreements have to “work[] both ways,” binding
the government and the defendant alike to their conditions. Id. (citation omitted). We
have said that “[a defendant] cannot renege on his agreement.” Id. (citation omitted). A
defendant who stipulates to a point in a plea agreement cannot later make arguments
taking a contrary position. Id. When a defendant seeks the benefits of a plea agreement
without its burdens, we have “no difficulty” saying no. Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the plea agreement plainly states that Stanley must comply with SORNA.
As noted earlier, it says
[t]he defendant understands that the court, as a condition of supervised
release or probation, must order the defendant to comply with all sex
offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act and that, if applicable, defendant must register and keep
registration current and accurate in each of the following jurisdictions: the
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location of residence; the location of employment; and location of any
school that defendant is attending.
(App. at 64 (emphasis added).) That sentence contains two distinct and independent
ideas joined by the conjunction “and.”3 The first part of the sentence mandates that
Stanley comply with SORNA’s sex offender registration requirements. The second part
states that he needs to register or keep his registration current in each jurisdiction where
he lives and works, “if applicable.” We interpret that second part to merely indicate that
Stanley may not have to take any further action if he lives and works in a single location
during the course of his supervised release. The “if applicable” language need not and
should not be imported into the first part of the sentence. At bottom, Stanley agreed to
comply with SORNA’s registration requirements, and he cannot now discard the
obligation he voluntarily accepted.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence in full.

3

The government could make the pertinent sentence in the plea agreement clearer
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